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The religious legitimization and ‘pax Islamica’ of the Taliban generally consists of a 
denouncement of the type of Islam and Islamic law implemented by the ‘medieval’ and 
‘fundamentalist’ Taliban. In turn, any official denouncement of the Taliban’s 
misinterpretation of Islam is based on an implied claim that other, more correct and 
appropriate, interpretations of Islam and, in turn, of Islamic law, will be implemented by the 
current government. There is little doubt that at least in the foreseeable future no Afghan 
government will be able to survive on a purely secular, non-Islamic, basis. Thus, Hamid 
Karzai’s government has been careful to avoid any actions which might signal to the country 
that Afghanistan is slipping its Islamic moorings. At the same time he has been keen to 
reassure the international community that his government was committed to international law 
as applicable to Afghanistan, and that there was no prospect for the return to the religious 
fundamentalism executed by the Taliban. Political Islam is an intensely legalistic movement: 
Islam’s claims to govern virtually all aspects of human life have historically manifested 
themselves in legal terms. It is the extent and degree of the implementation of Islamic law 
which is often cited as the litmus test for the Islamic credentials of an Islamic state. The role 
of Islamic law in Afghanistan’s legal system is therefore a most delicate issue. Sofar the 
government has avoided any explicit engagement with this issue. The country’s rather 
conservative Chief Justice HH Judge Shinwari has not been replaced nor has there been any 
attempt to deal with the legacy of 4700 judges [according to HH Judge Shinwari] which the 
current government inherited. However, it is noticeable that in turn the Chief Justice now 
accepts that Afghanistan’s legal system is a mixed one consisting of Islamic law and of state 
enacted legislation. The relative calm over the thorny issue of the role of Islam in the legal 
system has been achieved by a concerted effort to avoid any direct dealings with it. This 
inertia is reflected in the barely visible efforts of the international community to rebuild the 
country’s legal system. Italy, the appointed lead nation for Afghanistan’s legal reconstruction, 
has delegated this task to the prestigious and well-known International Development Law 
Organisation [IDLO]. In turn, IDLO has established a branch office in Kabul and has 
embarked on the task of assembling a complete of Afghan laws past and present. Various 
commissions constituted under the provisions of the Bonn Agreement are dealing with legal 
issues but thus far only few visible manifestations of this work have emerged. The most 
decisive document to determine the future role of Islamic law, namely the Constitution, is 
being prepared in secret and is as yet, at least officially, marked ‘strictly confidential’. In the 
meantime, it is not so much the substantive law but legal institutions which have been the 
focus of international assistance. For instance, a German government sponsored conference, 
originally meant to examine the role of Islam in the legal system, instead focused on the 
training and education of legal jurists. Attention is being paid to the country’s police force, the 
infrastructure of courts, the payment of judges, the state of the country’s law schools, etc. 
However, there is virtually no domestic or international engagement in the area of substantive 
law. Thus, discussions on Afghanistan’s compliance with its international obligations under 
various human rights treaties have been avoided at international conferences and meetings 
and domestic gatherings. The country’s surprise ratification of the international Convention 
on the Elimination of All Discrimination against Women without any reservation has not 
resulted in any efforts by the government to examine whether or not the existing legal system 
complies with this international legal treaty. This paper will begin with a very tentative 
analysis of the position of Islamic law in Afghanistan’s recent past. It will be argued that 
Afghanistan’s legal system has been marked by several faultlines. The first is common to 
most legal systems of the developing world, namely the wide gap between official, state made 
and enforced law, and the legal reality, which bears no resemblance to the official legal 
system. The second faultline manifests itself in the role of Islamic law within this essentially 
plural legal system. Islamic law derives its authority not from the state but from religion. As a 
result at times it has clashed not only with positive laws but also with customary laws de facto 
co-existing with state laws. Prior to 1979 the state was able to legislate in areas of law 
traditionally occupied by Islamic law.  
However, it is likely that in the present any attemot to dilute ‘purist’ interpretations of Islamic 
law will be considered controversial. It will be argued that it is decisive for the government to 
establish a legitimate mechanism which allows it to exercise control over the role of Islam in 
the future legal order. Any delegation of this authority to institutions outside the control of the 
government is liable to create alternative centres of power and political legitimisation. History 
has shown that governments perceived as un-islamic have little chance of long term survival. 
A Mixed Legal System Currently, Afghanistan does not have a uniform legal system. 
Serious human rights abuses continue to occur on a regular basis and perpetrators remain 
outside the reach of Afghanistan’s transitional government under President Karzai. The legal 
reality is marked by impunity: not only do past grave violations of human rights remain 
unpunished but such abuses are continuing without any prospect for a legal system capable of 
bringing the perpetrators to justice. Formally Hamid Karzai’s government is responsible for 
the implementation of the Bonn Agreement and representing the state’s central and ultimate 
authority his government must be enabled to carry out its duties imposed not only by 
Afghanistan’s domestic laws but also the country’s international legal obligations. There is no 
doubt that Hamid Karzai’s government is sincere in its efforts to address human rights’ 
abuses. However, Afghanistan must still be regarded as a failed state whose central 
government does not enjoy a monopoly on the legitimate use of power. In purely practical 
terms the government has found it difficult to address the issue of basic human rights. The 
authority of the central government does not extend far beyond Kabul. Thus, a prerequisite for 
the establishment of the rule of law and a legal system capable of guaranteeing basic 
fundamental rights is currently not present. Legal and judicial institutions, if they exist, face a 
host of problems. First and foremost, courts are understaffed and ill equipped. Secondly, 
neither judges, lawyers, nor educational institutions have access to applicable statutes and 
associated legal materials. Afghanistan’s prolonged civil war has brought with it the 
destruction or disappearance of most statutes. Thus, in practice, courts apply Islamic law and 
not the provisions of the 1964 Constitution or the applicable statutory laws. However, even 
during the period from 1964 until the outbreak of the civil war caused by the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan in 1979, Afghanistan’s framework of constitutional and statutory laws seems 
to have played only a minor role in the administration of justice. In practice and legal reality, 
Afghanistan’s courts have been applying Islamic and customary laws. Further, non-state fora 
for the settlement of disputes like jirgas, ie. councils of elders, have always played an 
important role in the legal system. Part II of the Bonn Agreement commits the Transitional 
Government of Afghanistan to a interim legal framework until the adoption of a new 
Constitution which consists of ‘(i) The Constitution of 1964, (a) to the extent that its 
provisions are not inconsistent with those contained in this agreement [ie. the Bonn 
Agreement], and (b) with the exception of those provisions relating to the monarchy and to 
the executive and legislative bodies provided in the Constitution; and, (ii) existing laws and 
regulations, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the Bonn Agreement or with 
international legal obligations to which Afghanistan is a party, or with those applicable 
provisions contained in the Constitution of 1964, provided that the Interim Authority shall 
have the power to repeal or amend those laws and regulations.’ In respect of the judiciary the 
Bonn Agreement provides in Part II (2) that ‘The judicial power of Afghanistan shall be 
independent and shall be vested in a Supreme Court of Afghanistan and such other courts as 
may be established by the Interim Administration. The Interim Administration shall establish 
with the assistance of the United Nations, a Judicial Commission to rebuild the domestic 
justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law 
and Afghan legal traditions.’ The contrast between the requirements to be met by 
Afghanistan’s legal system under the provisions of the Bonn Agreement and the legal reality 
as it pertains in the country can only be described as dramatic: whereas the provisions of the 
1964 Constitution and Afghanistan’s international legal obligations can be ascertained 
without any difficulty, the same does not apply to the existing laws and regulations. The latter 
have to a large extent physically disappeared and many of them can only be located in foreign 
libraries and collections. Thus both the Interim Administration and the Transitional 
Government, which took control over the affairs of the state in June 2002, having been elected 
by an Emergency Loya Jirgah, are faced with the impossible task of enforcing a legal system 
that within Afghanistan does not even exist on paper. Like many other developing countries, 
Afghanistan’s official law, i.e. the formal legal system established under the provisions of a 
constitution, does not represent the de facto norms that govern the lives of the majority of the 
population. The inability of successive governments to implement statutory laws in a uniform 
and countrywide manner is as much a reflection of underdevelopment as it is of political 
constraints. Without exception every single survey of Afghanistan’s legal system observed, 
and frequently lamented, the fact that Afghanistan’s statutory laws and regulations existed, for 
all practical purposes, on paper only. It is important to note that the limited practical value of 
Afghanistan’s statutory law cannot be attributed solely to the decline and eventual demise of a 
central political authority in Afghanistan as a result both of more than two decades of civil 
war and the reign of the Taliban. In a carefully researched article on ‘Legal Elites in Afghan 
Society’, published in 1980, M.G. Weinbaum found that even ‘where formal statutes exist, 
judges typically lack the training and research resources required to identify appropriate 
provisions of the law.’ he also finds that ‘many are also understandably overwhelmed by the 
necessity to adjust positive law, often foreign in origin, to the Afghan experience.’ The 
splitting of the legal system into an official law and unofficial law has been a hallmark of 
Afghan legal history ever since attempts were made to introduce statutory laws. In fact, it is 
possible to go even further and state with some confidence that past experience would suggest 
that any attempt to implement and enforce secular statutory laws which depart from 
customary and/or Islamic law is liable to be met with protests and civil unrest. The difficulties 
in implementing statutory laws experienced in the 1960s and 1970s are further compounded 
by purely practical considerations. First and foremost, many of the statutes framed and passed 
during that period are currently unavailable in Afghanistan. Most courts do not have access to 
or a collection of Afghanistan’s main statutory laws. Even the Ministry of Justice and the 
University of Kabul do not hold complete sets of Afghanistan’s statutory laws and 
regulations. The International Human Rights Law Group and the American Bar Association 
collected various Afghan statutes, principally concerned with penal, civil and commercial 
law, reprinted them in Pakistan and presented them to the Ministry of Justice in early June 
2002. These laws must be regarded as important and their distribution within Afghanistan 
undoubtedly constitutes a significant step towards the establishment of a formal legal and 
judicial system. However, it must be noted that even during periods when these laws were 
presumably more easily available, they were in fact rarely applied and did not offer an 
accurate representation of Afghanistan’s de facto legal system. As noted earlier, even during 
the 1960s and 1970s judges either had only limited knowledge of them or were reluctant to 
apply them. Lack of training, knowledge and purely ideological reasons make it highly 
unlikely that the redistribution of some of the statutes comprising a significant part of 
Afghanistan’s corpus of codified laws will have any immediate impact on human rights and 
the rule of law in Afghanistan even in metropolitan areas like Kabul. Further, irrespective of 
the availability of printed versions of legal codes, there exists a fundamental difficulty in 
identifying the applicable law in Afghanistan mainly as a result of rapid political change and 
concurrent changes in the formal legal system. The Bonn Agreement provides that until the 
adoption of the new Constitution the following legal framework shall be applicable on an 
interim basis: ‘The existing laws and regulations, to the extent that they are not inconsistent 
with this agreement or with the international legal obligations to which Afghanistan is a party, 
or with those applicable provisions contained in the Constitution of 1964, provided that the 
Interim Authority shall have the power to repeal or amend those laws and regulations.’ This 
means that all existing laws are applicable unless they are in violation of the 1964 
Constitution, international legal obligations or the Bonn Agreement. Important changes to the 
law were introduced as a result of political changes in the late 1970s. An example for this is 
the Law of Criminal Procedure. Whereas the Criminal Procedure Law of May 1965, as 
amended in 1974, provided that detention of a suspect on whatever grounds cannot exceed 
one week unless authorized by a court (see articles 26, 28, and 29), this situation changed 
profoundly in 1981. The Law on the Discovery and Investigation of Crimes and Supervision 
of the Attorney General on Its Legal Enforcement of March 1979, as amended in 1981, 
allowed the Attorney General much wider powers including the power to detain a suspect for 
up to six months without any court approval being required. It is not certain which of the two 
provisions govern at least in theory the detention periods of suspects in criminal 
investigations. The same degree of legal uncertainty pertains to other areas of law that 
underwent changes as a result of political transformations. Most prominent are the land 
reform laws, which were introduced following the coup of April 1978: it has been impossible 
to establish the fate of these laws or the present status of any measures taken under them. A 
careful study of the statutory framework of Afghanistan’s legal system is therefore fraught 
with both practical and theoretical difficulties. On a practical level, it is doubtful whether any 
wider dissemination of existing laws would result in an improvement of the rule of law or 
human rights. 
Secondly, the corpus of statutory laws presents itself in layers, each layer representing 
particular periods of governance. It is primarily a political task to decide which of these layers 
should be applied, if at all. The redistribution of laws from a particular period cannot therefore 
be regarded as a politically neutral exercise since it imposes on the existing courts and 
institutions a particular choice of laws. Statutory laws were enacted under the Constitutions or 
Interim Constitutions of Afghanistan of 1964, 1977, 1980, 1987, 1990 and 1992. During all 
these periods of constitutional rule new statutes were enacted and existing ones amended or 
superseded.  
Thus, it is likely to be regarded controversial which laws should now be recognized as valid 
and applicable. Islam and the 1964 Constitution According to the Bonn Agreement, the 1964 
Constitution is applicable on an interim basis to the extent that its provisions are not 
inconsistent with the Agreement itself, with the exception of the provisions relating to the 
monarchy and to the executive and legislative bodies provided in the Constitution. Articles 25 
to 40 of the 1964 Constitution contain provisions on ‘The Basic Rights and Duties of the 
People’. If properly observed by all authorities and political and military factions these 
articles would go a very long way towards safeguarding human rights and the rule of law in 
Afghanistan. Article 25 provides for equality before the law: ‘The people of Afghanistan, 
without any discrimination or preference, have equal rights and obligations before the law.’ 
The article is remarkable in that it is simple, clear and unambiguous. However, as will be seen 
later, it must be regarded as a programmatic statement rather than a reflection of even the 
official law. This applies especially to the area of family law, which is governed by Islamic 
law, and which provides for differential treatment of men and women, especially in the areas 
of marriage, divorce and inheritance. As observed earlier, the legal reality itself departs 
significantly from the principles enunciated in Article 25. Article 26 contains a wide range of 
fundamental rights all concerned with the right to a fair trial, liberty and human dignity. 
Article 26 provides that: ‘Liberty is the natural right of the human being. This right has no 
limitations except the liberty of others and public interest defined by the law. The liberty and 
dignity of the human being are inviolable and inalienable. The State has the duty to respect 
and protect the liberty and dignity of the individual. No deed is considered a crime except by 
virtue of law in force before its commission. No one may be punished except on the orders of 
a competent court rendered after an open trial held in the presence of the accused. No one 
may be pursued or arrested except in accordance with the provisions of the law. No one may 
be detained except on order of a competent court, in accordance with the provisions of the 
law. Innocence is the original state; the accused is considered to be innocent unless found 
guilty by a final judgement of a court of law. Crime is a personal deed. Pursuit, arrest or 
detention of the accused and the execution of sentence against him does not affect any other 
person. Torturing another human being is not permissible. No one can torture or issue orders 
to torture a person even for the sake of discovering facts, even if the person involved is under 
pursuit, arrest or detention or is condemned to a sentence. Imposing punishment incompatible 
with human dignity is not permissible. A statement obtained from an accused or any other 
person by compulsion is not valid. Confession of a crime means the admission made by an 
accused willingly and in full possession of his senses before a competent court with regard to 
the commission of a crime legally attributed to him. Every person has the right to appoint a 
defence counsel for the removal of a charge legally attributed to him. 
Indebtedness of one person to another cannot cause deprivation or curtailment of the liberty of 
the debtor. The ways and means of recovering a debt shall be specified in the law. Every 
Afghan is entitled to travel within the territory of his State and settle anywhere except in areas 
prohibited by the law. Similarly, every Afghan has a right to travel outside of Afghanistan and 
to return to Afghanistan according to the provisions of the law. No Afghan shall be sentenced 
to banishment from Afghanistan or within its territory.’ The provisions of Article 26 are 
strengthened by Article 100 which provides that ‘In the courts of Afghanistan trials are held 
openly and everyone may attend in accordance with the provisions of the law. The court may 
in exceptional cases specified in the law hold closed trials. However, the judgement shall 
always be openly proclaimed. The courts are bound to state in their judgements the reasons 
for their verdicts.’ The fair trial provisions contained in Articles 26 and 100, if properly 
implemented and reflected in the substantive and procedural laws of the country would go a 
long way in safeguarding basic human rights in Afghanistan. A closer examination of 
Afghanistan’s criminal laws, below, reveals that some of the constitutional provisions 
contained in Article 26 remain unimplemented. However, in the current situation this must be 
regarded as a comparatively small detail, considering that the reality of the criminal justice 
system as it currently operates in large parts Afghanistan, remains outside the legal system 
contemplated by the 1964 Constitution. Article 29 guarantees the right to property, Article 30 
provides for freedom and secrecy of communications of persons, while Article 31 provides 
that freedom of thought and expression are inviolable. Article 27 provides that no Afghan can 
be extradited to a foreign state. A person’s residence is declared inviolable under Article 28. 
The right to assemble unarmed, without the prior permission of the state, for legitimate and 
peaceful purposes, in accordance with the provisions of the law, is guaranteed under Article 
32, as is the right to form political parties. Apart from these civil and political rights, the 1964 
Constitution also provides for limited social and economic rights. These comprise a right to 
free education (Article 34) and health, with the limits of its means (Article 36). What is absent 
from the 1964 Constitution is a properly defined and guaranteed constitutional mechanism for 
the enforcement of these rights. Article 33 provides that ‘Anyone who, without due cause, 
suffers damage from the Administration is entitled to compensation and may file a suit in a 
court for its recovery.’ However, this article falls short of providing an effective enforcement 
mechanism. Also missing are constitutional provisions that afford these rights any higher 
protection against constitutional amendment or removal than the other parts of the 1964 
Constitution. Article 120 provides that only adherence to the basic principles of Islam, 
Constitutional Monarchy in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, and the 
values embodied in Article 8 shall not be subject to amendment. The Judiciary The Bonn 
Agreement provides that: ‘The judicial power of Afghanistan shall be independent and shall 
be vested in a Supreme Court of Afghanistan and such other courts as may be established by 
the Interim Administration. 
The Interim Administration shall establish with the assistance of the United Nations, a 
Judicial Commission to rebuild the domestic justice system in accordance with Islamic 
principles, international standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions.’ Articles 97 to 
107 of the 1964 Constitution contain detailed provisions on the establishment of courts and 
the status and independence of the judiciary. Article 97 establishes the judiciary as an 
independent organ of the State. The only court actually established under the Constitution is 
the Supreme Court (Article 98) while the number of the other courts is determined by law. 
The jurisdiction of the courts to hear cases brought before them is exclusive: ‘Under no 
circumstances shall a law exclude from the jurisdiction of the judiciary, as defined in this 
Title, a case or sphere, and assign it to other authorities’ (Article 98). However, Article 98 
also provides that this provision does not prevent the establishment of military courts ‘but the 
jurisdiction of these courts is confined to offences related to the armed forces of Afghanistan.’ 
The Supreme Court is accorded a high degree of supervisory jurisdiction over the lower 
judiciary. Charges of misconduct against a judge are heard and decided by the Supreme 
Court, and all judges with the exception of the judges of the Supreme Court itself, are 
appointed ‘by the King on the recommendation of the Chief Justice.’ Article 105 provides for 
the appointment of nine persons to the Supreme Court by the King and lays down minimum 
qualifications consisting of age (having completed 35 years), of being formally eligible for 
election to the Parliament (see Article 46 of the Constitution for these qualifications) and of 
having ‘sufficient knowledge of jurisprudence, the national objectives and the laws and the 
legal system of Afghanistan.’ The terms of tenure of the nine Supreme Court judges provide 
for a reasonably high degree of judicial independence: once appointed the King can review 
the appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court only ten years after their respective dates 
of appointment and they can otherwise only be removed from office in accordance with 
Article 106. The latter article provides that after an initial demand of one third of the members 
of Parliament for the impeachment of a judge of the Supreme Court ‘on a charge of a crime 
stemming from the performance of their duty’, two thirds of the members of Parliament have 
to approve this demand. Should this happen the accused judge is suspended from office and a 
meeting of the Loya Jirgah is called to appoint a Commission of Enquiry. Should the report of 
the Commission indict the accused judge then a two-thirds majority of the Loya Jirgah can 
authorize the prosecution of the accused judge. A special tribunal appointed by one of the 
members of the Loya Jirgah then tries the accused in accordance with the criminal procedures 
of the Supreme Court. Except in cases of dismissal under Article 106, the judges of the 
Supreme Court shall, after their tenure in office, enjoy for the rest of their lives all the 
financial privileges pertaining to the term of their services. The Supreme Court as the 
country’s apex court is also constitutionally charged with the organization and functions of 
the Courts and the judicial affairs of the State in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution and the law. This duty extends to the organization of the administrative affairs of 
the other courts, including the administration of the budget of the judiciary. The latter is 
prepared by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Government and, after the approval of 
the Supreme Court, is presented by the government to the Parliament as part of the State 
budget. The budget of the judiciary is administered directly by the Supreme Court. The 
service conditions of judges are identical to those of civil servants but ‘their appointment, 
promotion, dismissal, retirement and calling to account shall be within the competence of the 
Supreme Court, in accordance with the law’ (Article 107). Thus the Supreme Court occupies 
a strong position in the constitutional framework of Afghanistan. Once appointed its judges 
enjoy a high degree of independence and a high degree of control and supervisory jurisdiction 
over the lower judiciary and courts. The re-establishment of a formal judicial system has been 
difficult. In the metropolitan areas of Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul civil and criminal courts 
appear to be functioning, as does the Supreme Court. However, it is far from clear who 
originally appointed the judges to these courts and to what extent they have ever enjoyed the 
exclusive jurisdiction over all trials as provided in Article 98 of the 1964 Constitution. The 
Law of the Jurisdiction and Organization of the Courts of Afghanistan of (Muslim Year) 1346 
[1968] [the 1968 Law] contains detailed provisions on the hierarchy and organization of 
courts. It establishes the following courts: General Courts, which include the Supreme Court, 
the Court of Cassation, the High central Court of Appeal, Provincial Courts and Primary 
Courts; and Specialized Courts that include juvenile courts, labour courts, and other 
specialized courts established by the Supreme Court when needed. Field work revealed that in 
Kabul at least these courts are in operation though the number of cases heard by them and the 
exclusivity of their jurisdiction could not be ascertained. The Supreme Court itself consists of 
four departments: the department of the Administration of the Judiciary, the department of 
Judicial Inspection, the department of Research and Investigation, and the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office of the Judiciary. The 1968 Law contains detailed provisions on the judicial jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court as well as its administrative powers and also establishes a Court of 
Cassation centred in the Supreme Court. The Court of Cassation functions as an 
administrative court of appeal and is divided into three ‘Collegiums’: the Collegium of Civil 
and Commercial cases, the Commercial Collegium and the Public Rights Collegium. The 
Court of Cassation can either annul the judgement of a lower court or confirm it. In case of  
the former a re-trial is ordered. The next level of the court structure consists of the High 
Central Court of Appeal. It consists of three Collegiums similar to those of the Court of 
Cassation and its main function is to hear appeals against judgements pronounced by 
provincial courts. Each province has one Provincial Court which enjoys appellate jurisdiction 
over decisions made by primary courts and a limited original jurisdiction primarily involving 
cases relating to charges against public officials, press offences and smuggling. The Chief 
Justice of Afghanistan determines the number of primary courts in each province. In 1980, 
there were about 220 primary courts and 28 provincial courts. Article 60 provides that the 
provincial courts are duty bound to provide the primary courts, located within their 
jurisdiction, with the necessary administrative services and assist in organizing their 
administrative affairs. All cases are in the first instance decided by a primary court but its 
decision is considered final only if in civil cases the value of the subject of the dispute does 
not exceed the amount of 500 Afghanis and in criminal cases, if the sentence does not exceed 
one month’s imprisonment. In the absence of an appeal by the contesting parties, a primary 
court’s decision becomes binding with the exception of cases involving minors, capital 
punishment, quisas, and life imprisonment. In addition to the 1968 Law, the Law of the 
Administration of the Courts of Justice of 1355 [1977] provides, in 279 Articles, much greater 
detail on the organization of lower courts and the High Court. It deals with the making of the 
complaint, court proceedings and maintenance of discipline, the appearance of contesting 
parties and the manner of hearing a case and finally the pronouncement of judgements and the 
lodging of appeals. By far the most remarkable feature of this law is its insistence on open 
trials. Article 57 provides that ‘In the Courts of Justice, all trials are held open’. A Law of 
Statutory Limitations for Primary, Appellate and Review Hearings of Civil and Criminal 
cases in Afghanistan of 1324 [1946], and a Law Concerning the Administration of 
Government Cases of 1343 [1965] provide further detailed provisions on court procedure and 
the administration of justice. A review of these laws, read together with the relevant 
constitutional provisions, suggests a developed and functioning system of courts modelled 
closely on civil law jurisdiction, but incorporating some elements of Islamic procedural laws, 
as for instance, the central position of the oath in criminal and civil trials. The Interim 
Authority appears to have continued the system of courts as they existed prior to the seizing 
of power of the Taliban in 1996. Under the Taliban, the pre-existing courts remained in place 
but it appears that in practice their powers and jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases 
was limited: religious courts established by the Taliban on an ad hoc basis frequently heard 
and decided cases. The main structures of the judicial system as established under the 1964 
Constitution and the laws mentioned above appear to have survived the political upheavals of 
the past 23 years, at least in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. A number of courts exist and those 
visited appeared to be functioning, i.e. there were judges, administrators, and clerks as well as 
litigants. As a general rule, there appear to be no open trials. The legal profession is dealt with 
below but it should be mentioned at this stage that in none of the courts visited were any 
lawyers, nor indeed were there any facilities for lawyers. However, it is uncertain to what 
extent even the courts that appear to be functioning represent a true reflection of the legal 
landscape. 
Who has access to these courts; what proportion of civil and or criminal cases are heard by 
them; to what extent were the judges appointed in accordance with the law, and equally 
important, under which law; how independent are they; which procedural laws do they follow 
and what substantive law do they apply are all questions which cannot be answered with any 
degree of certainty. Those judges interviewed had no access to Afghan statutes or any of the 
several constitutions, let alone the 1964 Constitution nor did they seem to know much about 
the procedural laws on the organization of courts. It was equally difficult to ascertain how 
judgements were enforced and by whom. The Office of the Public Prosecutor The 
constitutional position of the public prosecution service established by the 1964 Constitution 
is defined as follows: ‘Investigation of crimes shall be conducted, in accordance with the 
provisions of law, by the Attorney General, who is part of the Executive organ of the State’ 
(Article 103). This constitutional arrangement was continued in the 1977 Constitution (Article 
106). This meant that in practice the public prosecutor’s office was located in the Ministry of 
Justice. However, in the Interim Constitution of 1980 the Attorney General became an 
independent organ answerable to the Revolutionary Council. This pattern was also reflected in 
the 1987 Constitution (Article 119). Currently, the Attorney General’s office continues to be 
independent of the Ministry of Justice. The Law of Saranwali, i.e. the public prosecutor of 
1345 [1966], which at least in theory regulates the Office of the Public Prosecutor, places his 
office under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice. According to Article 10 of this law ‘ 
the public prosecutor and the police shall perform the duties of detection, investigation and 
the prosecution of crimes through their own professional members.’ The law contemplates 
that the original investigation of a crime, once commenced by the police, has to be transferred 
to the public prosecutor within 24 hours. After completion of an investigation the public 
prosecutor either closes the file or refers the matter to a court. The Criminal Procedure Law of 
1344 [1965] confers an exclusive power on the public prosecutor to file and prosecute a 
criminal action. The Office of the Public Prosecutor appears to have been abolished by the 
Taliban but has been resurrected by the current Government of President Karzai. However, 
there seems to be a certain degree of competition between the public prosecutor’s office and 
the Ministry of Justice. In Kabul, the Office of the Public Prosecutor appeared to be 
functioning well. According to the CRAFT report ‘Filling the Vacuum: Prerequisites to 
Security in Afghanistan’ [March 2002], Kabul Province has 184 staff and had by early March 
310 cases pending, 42 of which had been submitted to the relevant courts. In 1980, nearly 100 
districts had no public prosecutor at all. As in the case of the judiciary little is known about 
the functioning of the public prosecutor offices outside Kabul province. The Office of the 
Saranwali in Mazar-e-Sharif had only the most basic equipment, consisting of an old desk and 
a few chairs, no access to procedural or substantive criminal laws, and was staffed at the time 
of the visit by just one public prosecutor. He described his function as being very limited 
since military commanders in charge of various sectors of the city were also in full control of 
the investigation and prosecution of crimes, which were conducted by their own militias. 
Legal Professionals The only law that could be located as being directly concerned with the 
legal profession is the Law for Organizing Affairs of Defence Attorneys of 1351 [1972]. As 
stated above, according to the 1964 Constitution, ‘Every person has the right to appoint 
defence counsel for the removal of a charge legally attributed to him.’(Article 26). This is 
reflected in Articles 1 and 2 of the 1972 Law which provide that ‘A defence attorney has the 
right to defend deputor before all courts and before the Saranwali in accordance with the 
provisions of this law and other laws.’ and ‘Either of the parties to a suit has the right to 
assign a defence attorney for acting in his defence.’ The 1972 Law provides in Article 10 for 
the provision of defence attorneys to destitute persons to be paid from the state budget if so 
ordered by the relevant trial court. The 1972 Law regulates the admission to the bar of 
defence attorneys as well as their minimum qualifications. A Control Committee in the 
Ministry of Justice consisting of representatives of the Supreme Court, the law school, the 
Saranwali’s office and three senior defence lawyers has the duty to accept or reject the 
requests for engaging in the profession of defence attorney. The qualifications stipulated by 
the act are basic: a minimum age of 25 years, a law degree from a college of shariat, a college 
of law or an official sharia madrassa and no deprivation of political rights by a court’s verdict. 
There is no need or facility for vocational legal training or continuing professional 
development of members of the legal profession. The 1972 Law stipulates the basic rights and 
duties of lawyers and also contains some provisions on professional ethics and disciplinary 
provisions. The 1972 Law is contained in the collection of Afghan laws compiled by Robert 
Hager in 1975. No reference to this law could be located in Afghanistan itself and it appears 
to have been temporarily lost and thus not applied. Survived has, however, the remnants the 
Lawyers’ Association of Afghanistan, a voluntary body of Afghan lawyers formed in 1985. 
Its President, Mr. Shah Mahmmod Kerad, stated that in the late 1980s the association had 
about 5,000 members but that the Taliban closed it down in 1996. It reopened its offices only 
in November 2001. A Women’s Bar Association was formed in Peshawar several years ago. 
It has about 40 members and has, under the leadership of Mrs Paikan, opened an office in 
Kabul. However, the impression gained through visits to courts was that there was a glaring 
absence of criminal defence lawyers. Weinbaum confirms this impression in his article ‘Legal 
Elites in Afghan Society’. He observes that ‘By official count there are 162 defence attorneys, 
although not all are licensed for comprehensive practice or are fully active’ (op. cit., p. 40). 
These figures confirm the impression that defence lawyers have never featured very 
prominently in recent Afghan legal experience. Law students and graduates spoken to were all 
reluctant to enter the legal profession since they did not feel sufficiently well trained - after all 
in practice courts apply Islamic law - and in any event thought that they would not be able to 
make a living as legal professionals. Substantive and Procedural Laws Article 102 of the 1964 
Constitution provides that ‘The courts in the cases under their consideration shall apply the 
provisions of this Constitution and the laws of the State. Whenever no provision exists in the 
Constitution or the laws for a case under consideration, the courts shall, by following the basic 
principles of the Hanafi Jurisprudence of the Shariaat of Islam and within the limits set forth 
in this Constitution, that in their opinion secures justice in the best possible way.’ The Bonn 
Agreement provides for the wholesale resurrection of the existing laws subject to the proviso 
that these laws are not inconsistent with the Agreement, the 1964 Constitution or 
Afghanistan’s international legal obligations. By a decree dated 5 January 2002 the Interim 
Authority officially repealed all ‘decrees, laws, edicts, regulations and mandates, which are 
inconsistent with the 1964 Constitution and the Bonn Agreement’. It is interesting to note that 
the decree does not expressly repeal laws that are inconsistent with Afghanistan’s 
international legal obligations. These are contained in a number of international treaties 
including the Convention of the Rights of the Child, the Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Discrimination against Women, the International Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and, finally, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The 
Ministry of Justice has been assigned the task of identifying the inconsistent laws in the 
course of a comprehensive legislative assessment. As already mentioned the assessment is 
hampered by the fact that many laws are not available. The relative obscurity of Afghanistan’s 
statutory laws is not a new phenomenon. In the introduction to the most comprehensive 
collection of translated Afghan laws, Robert Hager remarked, in 1975, that ‘in a country 
where Islamic law study is the basic training for judges and where the written laws remain 
uncompiled and are not widely distributed, the actual relationship between written law and the 
law of Islam is a matter for inquiry’ [p. iii].Thus there is little doubt that in current legal 
practice the written laws are of very limited importance. Criminal Law Substantive criminal 
law in Afghanistan continues to be governed in large part by Islamic law. The first 
comprehensive codification was enacted as the Penal Code of 1925. This was followed by the 
Criminal Law of September 1976. I have not been able to obtain a translation of this Code but 
a comprehensive description of it is contained in Gholam Vafai’s “Afghanistan. A Country 
Law Study”. It appears that the Criminal Law of 1976 introduces a quasi secular system for 
all tazir offences - i.e. offences which attract under Islamic criminal law only discretionary 
punishments administered by the state - but retains the system of Islamic hadd punishments, 
retaliation and payment of fines for ‘Islamic’ crimes, which are to be punished according to 
the principles of the Hanafi school of Islam. Depending on the nature of the evidence 
available against an accused, hadd punishments will be imposed on those who have been 
found guilty of theft, highway robbery, adultery, rape and fornication. Some of the 
punishments awarded for hadd offences, such as, for instance, the stoning to death of an 
adulterer if certain evidential requirements are met, do conflict with both the 1964 
Constitution, which prohibits the imposition of punishments ‘incompatible with human 
dignity’ (Article 31) and Afghanistan’s international legal obligations. 
However, it is not known whether the present administration intends to modify these aspects 
of Islamic criminal law. Apart from Islamic punishments, the remaining provisions of the 
Criminal Law of 1976 are modelled on European principles of criminal law and are thus 
unremarkable. It is in the area of Islamic punishments that the most flagrant conflicts with 
international human rights standards exist. This is also the area of law that is likely to be the 
most sensitive to reform. Procedural Laws The gap between procedural reality and theory is 
as wide as the one observed in respect of Afghanistan’s substantive laws. Professor Nasrulah 
Stanekzai stated in an interview with the author that not only are there inconsistencies in the 
law caused by successive amendments but that courts are very slow, do not conduct their 
hearings in public, litigants do not know the law or do not have access to trained lawyers and 
that there was excessive bureaucracy. In his opinion, the legal system did not encourage 
people to ask for their own rights. In theory, criminal procedure laws are governed by at least 
two laws. Firstly, the Criminal Procedure Law of 1965, as amended in 1974. According to 
Vafai, it follows the pattern of the French Penal Code. As noted above, the 1965 law was 
substantially amended by the Law on the Discovery and Investigation of Crimes and 
Supervision of the Attorney on its Legal Enforcement of 1979. The latter underwent further 
amendments in 1981. The sweeping powers accorded to the Attorney General and the secret 
services under these laws are most disturbing. The latter enjoys exclusive jurisdiction to 
investigate crimes against external security, crimes against internal security and certain 
political crimes, as well as kidnapping and the taking of hostages. Generally, a person arrested 
by the police must be reported within 72 hours to the public prosecutor, who has a further 72 
hours to decide whether to release the suspect or press charges. Further detention has to be 
authorized by a judge and should normally not exceed two months though the public 
prosecutor may extend the period of detention in special circumstances. On the conclusion of 
the investigation, the examining authority must issue an indictment that must be presented to 
the competent trial court. There is no jury system but the law provides for an open trial. The 
accused has the right to be represented by counsel or by a member of his family. 
Perhaps somewhat more unusually, the victim of a crime has the right to petition the trial 
court for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of the crime. Apart from minor 
sentences, where the verdict is final, a convict can file an appeal against conviction and 
sentence within ten days after the pronouncement of the sentence. Since the first level of 
appeal courts is the provincial court, a convict has to be transferred to the provincial capital 
for his appeal to be heard. The appeal hearing includes a rehearing of the evidence and the 
provincial court is also permitted to call new evidence and to conduct its own investigation. 
Cases appealed to the Supreme Court arising out of the original jurisdiction of the provincial 
court allow the Supreme Court to hear the evidence again. In all other appeals the Supreme 
Court reviews the legality of the conviction but does not in effect retry the case. The 
execution of a sentence cannot be carried out except by order of a competent court. It is 
unclear which of the procedural laws currently, at least de jure, apply in Afghanistan. The 
CRAFT report, compiled in March 2002, states that the public prosecutor can detain a suspect 
for up to seven days, after which the case must go to Court (p. 24). Neither the 1974 nor the 
1981 law provides for a seven-day detention period and thus there is either in existence 
another procedural law passed after 1981, or the information given by the Public Prosecutor 
was inaccurate. In any event, the inability to even determine with any degree of certainty how 
long a suspect can be held before being produced in court is in itself disconcerting. 
Juvenile Justice The 1976 Criminal Law makes provision for juvenile justice: a child under 
the age of seven years cannot be guilty of any criminal offence, and between the ages of seven 
and 13 a child, though presumed to be incapable of committing a crime, will be considered a 
juvenile delinquent and may be held in a correctional institution or put under the supervision 
and probation of parents or relatives. However, for persons between the ages of 13 and 18, a 
punishment of confinement in a correctional institution can be imposed. Mrs. Justice Anisa 
Rasoli, a female judge in Kabul’s special juvenile court, stated that procedures in the juvenile 
court were always in camera, and that juveniles used to be taken to a ‘punitive school’ rather 
than prison. A punitive school for male children was opened in 1970 and a female section 
became functional in 1974. However, all juvenile delinquents are currently confined in 
ordinary prisons. The juvenile court exercises exclusive jurisdiction over children between the 
ages of seven and 15 years. There is no right of appeal against a verdict pronounced by a 
juvenile court. Legal Status of Women Whilst the 1964 Constitution contains an equality-
before-the-law provision that does not differentiate between men and women, the legal system 
nevertheless does. Many aspects of Islamic family law as applied in Afghanistan accord 
differential rights to men and women. A Civil Code promulgated in 1977 did, however, 
introduce some significant reforms. The new Civil Code repealed the law of marriage of 1960 
and reformed several aspects of Hanafi family law. 
According to Dariz, under the 1977 Civil Law women are now permitted to choose a husband 
without needing the prior consent of their guardian, a divorce pronounced by a husband while 
intoxicated is no longer recognized as valid, and it establishes a minimum age of 15 years for 
a female to enter into a valid marriage. 
The legal capacity to marry is 18 years for boys and 16 years for girls. There is a registration 
requirement for all marriages and unlike the provisions of the 1960 Marriage Law non-
registration does not affect the marriage’s validity. The practice of polygamy has not been 
outlawed but has been regulated by the 1977 Civil Code. In order for a husband to enter into a 
second marriage he must prove that there is no fear of injustice to any wife, he must be able to 
provide the basic ecessities for all the wives, such as food, clothing, housing and health care, 
and a lawful reason must exist for the second marriage, such as the first wife being barren or 
sick with an illness requiring difficult treatment. A court can refuse to register a marriage that 
contravenes any of these conditions and an aggrieved wife can file a suit for divorce. Further, 
the 1977 Civil Code allows a woman to stipulate a right to divorce should her husband take a 
second wife irrespective of any compliance with the three conditions outlined above. The 
right of divorce of women continues to be restricted to a judicial divorce whilst a husband can 
divorce his wife through the extra-judicial pronouncement of a divorce either orally or in 
writing. The grounds for judicial separation include the husband suffering an incurable 
disease, his failure or inability to maintain his wife, his absence from his wife without reason 
for more than three years or his imprisonment for ten years or more, in which event the wife 
can ask for a divorce after the first five years imprisonment. It appears that the Islamic law in 
respect of inheritance and custody of children continues to be governed by Hanafi law. 
However, it is possible for a court to extend the age for the transfer of the custody of children 
from mother to father by an extra two years, if the extension serves the benefit of children. It 
appears that the 1977 Civil Law also established a family court but none was in operation at 
the time of writing. In actual legal practice the provisions of the 1977 Civil Law no longer 
appear to be applied. The demise of governmental institutions across Afghanistan means that 
marriages are generally no longer registered. This would render them void under the 1977 
Law. In practice, however, unregistered marriages are regarded as valid. 
The withering away of the 1977 Civil Law has reintroduced largely unreformed Hanafi family 
law and customary law into the sphere of family law. There appears to exist a large degree of 
confusion over the exact rights of women and their legal status. In June 2002, there were 
about 30 women confined in Kabul jail. Some of them were accused of criminal offences but 
the majority were, according to the Law Section of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, now 
headed by Professor Mahboba Haqoq Mal, who has succeeded Mrs. Sima Samar, detained for 
a variety of offences related to family law such as refusing to live with their husbands, 
refusing to marry a husband chosen by their parents, or for having run away from either the 
parental or the matrimonial home. It appears that these women have no access to lawyers, 
have no information on their rights, if any, and are generally left in jail until their respective 
relatives intervene. The most astonishing aspect of my findings was the profound uncertainty 
surrounding the legality of their detention. Even the female lawyers attached the Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs were unsure about the rights of women. There is no doubt that the legal 
position of women has improved since the demise of the Taliban, at least in the metropolitan 
areas of Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul: women are allowed to work, to move freely 
and to pursue education. Female students are now registered at the Law Faculty, are employed 
mainly in administrative functions in courts, in the Offices of Public Prosecutors and the 
Ministry of Justice. A dedicated Ministry for Women’s Affairs has been created. However, 
even in the legal sphere the situation remains highly unsatisfactory. The legal status of women 
is uncertain, as are their rights under both the 1964 Constitution and Islamic family law. The 
outgoing Minister for Women’s Affairs, Mrs. Sima Samar, has recently been charged with 
blasphemy though it is not known whether these charges are being pursued. Irrespective of the 
fate of this particular charge, her case must serve as a reminder that women who stand up for 
their rights take very real risks even in the post-Taliban legal order of the safe haven of Kabul. 
The legal problems faced by women are compounded by severe health problems caused by a 
shortage of health facilities and an inability to provide for women’s physical and emotional 
needs, domestic violence, and sexual abuse. The long period of confinement of women under 
the Taliban means that many women cannot compete successfully for jobs with men and are 
consequently economically disadvantaged. Most women continue to wear the burqua even in 
Kabul, apparently often prompted by fear rather than choice. Conclusion Any reform of the 
legal system to bring it in line with international human rights standards, or indeed with the 
provisions of the 1964 Constitution, requires as an essential prerequisite the existence of 
stable state structures able and willing to enforce laws. Only when this basic foundation has 
been established will it be possible to initiate any significant reforms. Currently, the rule of 
the state is for all practical purposes confined to Kabul and its immediate surroundings. Legal 
reform will therefore have to go hand in hand with the gradual expansion of state structures to 
rural areas and other cities. The main source for any legal reform has to be Afghanistan itself. 
Experience has shown that the wholesale import of foreign laws hardly ever succeeds in 
improving human rights standards or the rule of law. The impetus for change and reform thus 
has to come from within. The Judicial Commission and the Human Rights Commission 
already provide institutional mechanisms for initiating legal reform. The implementation of 
these reforms depends as much on the existence of institutional capacity as it does on political 
will and power. The international community can assist Afghanistan in a number of ways. 
First and foremost is the continued support in establishing a secure environment where 
militias are disarmed and local commanders operate within the rule of law. Secondly, and in 
parallel, is the need for institutional support and capacity building in the legal sector. This task 
ought to prioritize the inclusion of women and other vulnerable groups in the reform of the 
legal system. Whereas the reform and implementation of criminal procedural laws is in itself 
not controversial the reform of substantive criminal law without any doubt is. Any departure 
from Islamic law is likely to be viewed with suspicion and distrust by the majority of the 
population. However, reform is possible within Islamic law through reinterpretation and a 
strengthening of procedural and evidential safeguards contained in the corpus of Islamic law 
itself.  
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